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The Influence of Refugee Status 
on Palestinian Identity and the 
Impact of Identity on Durable 
Solutions to the Refugee 
Problem 
Michaela S. Clemens 
Abstract: Over the last fifty years the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has 
generated massive numbers of refugees. The scale and longevity of the 
conflict has made the Palestinian refugee problem the most protracted 
and largest refugee situation in the world today (Merhab et al. 2006). 
The processes of becoming a refugee and living as a refugee have had 
direct impacts on the formation of Palestinian identity. In this paper, I 
examine the influence of refugee status on identity and discuss how this 
identity affects potential solutions to the protracted refugee situation. I 
offer a brief historical background to the creation of Palestinian 
refugees. And, I outline what defines a refugee and, more specifically, 
a Palestinian refugee. The results of this review indicate that 
Palestinian refugee- identity is strongly influenced by a collective sense 
of victimization and nationalism. This collective identity is passed on 
to subsequent generations living in exile. However, refugee status is 
but one factor in the formation of identity - with other factors being 
gender, religion, place of exile, and place of origin. The final 
discussion also indicates that no easy solution to the refugee problem is 
imminent, but that the many components that make up Palestinian 
identity should be addressed when seeking solutions to both the refugee 
situation and the conflict that generated the refugees. 
Introduction 
The ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine has 
garnered much attention worldwide, resulting in numerous media and 
scholarly reports. This conflict is often presented as two parties with 
false symmetry, as if Israel and Palestine are simply two nations in 
opposition (Sharoni & Abu-Nimer 2004). The real asymmetry can only 
be understood by examining each popUlation, Palestinians and Israeli-
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Jews, not simply as opposing political entities, but as distinct national 
and cultural identities. This paper focuses specifically on one side of 
this asymmetry - Palestinian identity. Palestinian identity, in 
particular, is influenced by the designation of many of its people as 
refugees. A large number of these individuals are residing in other 
countries in the Middle East, and many others are in refugee 
settlements in the highly contested areas of the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip. The protracted nature of this refugee problem, half a 
century in the making, is contributing to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
and impeding efforts for peace. 
In this paper, I examine the influence of refugee status on the 
formation of Palestinian identity. The results of my research indicate 
that Palestinian identity is strongly influenced by a sense of 
victimization, which is evident by displacement and manifested as a 
collective nationalistic identity. It is not my intent, however, to suggest 
that there is one identity that comprises the diversity of individuals that 
call themselves Palestinian. Therefore, while my focus is on refugee 
status, I briefly address other factors that influence Palestinian identity 
and contribute to diversity within this group. 
In an effort to convey how being designated a refogee would 
impact identity, it is important to establish a context; therefore, I 
present a brief history, an explanation ofterms, and the implications of 
individual and collective identity in the larger scale of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. The first section of this paper is not a detailed history 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but a historical background to the 
creation of Palestinian refugees for the discussion that follows. In 
addition, I outline what defines a refugee and more specifically what 
defmes a Palestinian refogee. Moreover, I discuss how problems 
associated with a prolonged refugee identity contribute to an 
asymmetrical power balance between Palestine and Israel and how the 
refugee problem is impeding efforts for durable solutions. 
The Palestinian Diaspora and the Creation of Palestinian Refugees 
Zionism, the political movement to establish a Jewish 
homeland in the Middle East, can be traced as far back as the late 
1800s. As Khalidi (1991) notes, the problem with creating a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine was that this land was already inhabited. 
Palestine, under Ottoman rule until the end of the First World War, was 
populated by people that identified themselves as primarily Arabs, 
Muslims, and Ottomans (Mi'ari 1998). Zionist colonization persisted, 
however, and can be defmed in two major stages. 
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The first stage of colonization began in 1918 and culminated 
with a civil war in 1948 between the newly founded state ofIsrael and 
Arab armies. With Israel's victory, the Palestinian Diaspora began. By 
1950, the total number of refugees registered with the United Nations 
had reached more than 900,000 (UNRWA website 2006). These 
displaced persons were scattered throughout the Arab controlled 
territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and into the 
neighboring countries of Jordan, Lebanon, and the Syrian Arab 
Republic. Additionally, there were 45,800 Palestinians receiving UN 
relief aid still living in Israel - people who today we would call 
internally displaced persons, or IDPs (UNRWA website 2006). While 
crossing an international border is a key distinction between a refugee 
and an IDP, Palestinians were caught in unusual circumstances in that, 
with the legal formation of the state oflsrael, many Palestinians moved, 
but then so did the borders. 
The second stage of Zionist colonization began with the June 
1967 war and continues into 21 st century. Israel's victory in 1967 
gained the state control over East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the 
Gaza Strip, "thus taking over 100 percent of historical Palestine" 
(Khalidi 1991:9). By 2006, more than fifty years and several 
generations later, the Palestinian Diaspora can claim almost 4.3 million 
refugees in countries outside of Israel and in the territories of Gaza and 
the West Bank (UNRWA website 2006). 
In her examination of this situation, Sayigh asserts that many 
Palestinian refugees have been displaced over and over again - even 
though the big picture is of "two big bangs" of dispersion, scattering 
Palestinian peoples across the Middle East (1998:20). She cites 
numerous cases of repeated relocations, leading to constant insecurity 
and human rights violations. One such example was the nearly 350,000 
Palestinians expelled from Kuwait during the Gulf War of 1991-1992, 
including 12 families forced to live in the Cairo Airport for over five 
months after they were denied entry into Egypt (Sayigh 1998). 
Violations of individuals' basic human rights (e.g. forced evictions, 
restricted movement, degrading and inhuman treatment, etc.) are at the 
core of the refugee problem. However, to understand the rights of 
refugees, we must first understand what constitutes a refogee. 
The Status and Rights of Palestinian Refogees 
Article 1 A of the 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee 
as a person who has fled his or her country of nationality for fear of 
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion and is unable or unwilling 
98 
to return (Akram 2002). The Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the international agency 
charged with protecting refugees and resolving refugee situations, calls 
the Palestinian refugee situation "by far the most protracted and largest 
of all refugee problems in the world today" (Merhab et al. 2006:112). 
The UNHCR Department of International Protection has noted that a 
protracted refugee situation is "not a case of length of time but rather an 
inability to exercise basic rights and meet essential economic, social 
and psychological needs during years in exile. This leads to 
deprivation, physical insecurity and exploitation" (UNHCR 2004b:21). 
The scale of the Middle East refugee situation is so large that a 
separate UN organization was formed in 1949 to deal specifically with 
Palestine: the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East, or UNRWA. This agency defines 
Palestinian refugees as those "persons whose normal place of residence 
was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost both their 
homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli 
conflict... UNRWA's definition of a refugee also covers the 
descendents of persons who became refugees in 1948" (UNRWA 
website 2006). 
While the situation of Palestine was in the forefront during the 
establishment of the 1951 Refugee Convention, Palestinian refugees 
were categorically excluded. Article ID of the Convention states "This 
Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving 
from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance" 
(Akram 2002:39). Since Palestinian refugees were under the 
supervision of the newly formed UNRWA, they were and are not 
guaranteed any of the rights and freedoms afforded by the 1951 
Refugee Convention or later refugee protocols, nor are they given any 
protection or assistance from the UNHCR. In contrast, the UNRWA's 
mandate offers basic subsistence (food, clothing, shelter) to registered 
refugees, but has no obligation to protect Palestinian refugees from 
human rights violations (including the denial of education or 
employment, forced eviction, restrictions on movement within a host 
state, exploitation, arbitrary arrest, etc.). 
Limitations on basic human rights accompany the designation 
of an individual as a refugee. In host countries that are often 
economically and socially strained, the treatment of refugees may be 
far below international expectations (Steiner et al. 2003). Palestinians 
refugees found many of their rights constrained by host governments. 
In Lebanon in 1982, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs issued a 
list of jobs, ranging from banking to barbering, that were henceforth 
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closed to foreigners (Peteet 1996). The areas of employment left open 
to refugees were in the lowest echelon of income potential (domestic 
labor, construction, sanitation, etc.). Likewise in Jordan, the majority 
of refugees living inside and out of camps subsist at the lowest 
economic level (Sayigh 1998). This economic marginalization extends 
even to those Palestinians in the contested territories - where roughly 
70 percent of camp refugees and 50 percent of refugees outside of 
camps in Gaza are in the lowest economic bracket, and 40 percent in 
camps and 20 percent out of camps make up comparable figures in the 
West Bank (Sayigh 1998). 
Palestinian refugees in Arab countries and in the West Bank 
and Gaza are frequently denied access to employment, rights to 
property, freedom of religion, primary education, and identity papers 
(see Peteet 1996; Shiblak 1996; Sayigh 1998). These are all rights 
specifically outlined in the international law from which Palestinians 
are excluded. In most refugee situations the principle of non-
refoulement (non-return) seems sacrosanct - as refugees are spared 
forced return to their country of origin while their safety is at risk. 
Palestinians are the marked exception in that they do not qualify for 
any such rights under the 1951 Refugee Convention and return to their 
country of origin is their primary goal. 
In protracted refugee situations, human rights violations 
escalate with time, and refugee settlements, like those in the occupied 
territories, can become "incubators for future problems" (UNHCR 
2004a:3). As insecurity and instability progress, long-term refugee 
situations are particularly vulnerable to militarization. The UNHCR 
(1997) asserts that violence is inevitable in refugee settlements where 
young males, in particular, are deprived of education, recreation, and 
the opportunity to engage in productive activities and are powerless to 
plan for the future. These refugees are susceptible to recruitment into 
military groups from their country of origin or within the host country. 
In the case of Palestinian refugees, the development of organized 
militias is a factor in the ongoing conflict and violence between these 
groups and the Israeli army. 
Following the withdrawal of Egypt from the Gaza Strip in 
1956, Palestinian refugees in the territory found themselves under strict 
Israeli occupation. Confrontation and resistance to this occupation 
created a strong sense of unity among displaced Palestinians and was 
the catalyst for the development of the Palestinian Liberation 
Movement (Al-Shuaibi 1979). One publication of this movement called 
for militarization, "Our entity has been wrested from us. To arms, to 
arms, sons of Palestine .. .Into battle for the revival of your dignity and 
your obliterated entity." (Al-Shuaibi 1979:8, quoting the magazine 
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Filastinuna). This guerilla movement and the later formed Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) initially had little military impact on 
Israel, but the mobilization and intensification of armed Palestinians 
lead directly into the June 1967 war (AI-Shuaibi 1979, Khalidi 1991). 
Finally, with a refugee status that affords them no rights under 
international law or protections from increasing human rights violations 
and with the growing radicalization and militarization of settlements, 
displaced Palestinians are seeking solutions to their protracted plight. 
Three 'durable solutions' to long-term refugee conditions are 
recognized by international organizations, NGOs, and states alike. In 
their 2005 Human Rights Resolution, the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) "calls upon States to 
promote conditions conducive to the voluntary return of refugees in 
safety and with dignity and to support the other two durable solutions 
of local integration, or resettlement where appropriate" (OHCHR 2005: 
4). The Department of International Protections Resettlement 
Handbook (2004) asserts that the three solutions are complimentary and 
can function simultaneously as they did in situations for Bosnian 
refugees in the mid-1990s and for Afghan refugees in the early 2000s. 
These solutions - voluntary repatriation, resettlement, and local 
integration - all have distinct advantages and disadvantages. Each 
solution is an attempt to restore basic human rights to refugees and 
provide a permanent and successful resolution to the refugee condition. 
In fifty years of exile, Palestinian refugees have, thus far, been unable 
to achieve any of these durable solutions. 
Local integration has been a strong focus of the international 
community since the beginning of the diaspora. Palestinian refugees 
were expected to readily be absorbed into the surrounding Arab 
countries based on shared language, history, culture, and religion and 
the UNRWA was expected to assist in this transition (Shiblak 1996). 
Rather than easy integration, however, Shiblak (1996) notes that the 
UNRWA has been ineffectual in this task and Palestinian refugees have 
become more alienated and marginalized with time. This seems to be 
attributed to both external and internal forces, as Palestinians are 
resisting integration and host states are discouraging naturalization 
efforts, following a strategy to keep pressure on the return to Palestine. 
Successful local integration implies some measure of 
naturalization, typically the acquisition of citizenship. The original 
offer of refuge made by many of the Arab states was with the belief 
that a solution would be found and that the refugees' stay was 
temporary. With the passage of time, the growing number of refugees, 
and no solution in sight, many of the host states expressed sympathy 
for displaced Palestinians, but did not offer any avenues toward real 
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integration. At the beginning of the diaspora, most Arab states issued 
special refugee documents to Palestinians, with the exception of Jordan 
which granted refugees Jordanian nationality (Shiblak 1996). 
Residency in all host states is tenuous, however, as Palestinians are not 
guaranteed rights comparable to citizens and are subject to deportation. 
Shiblak suggests that the Arab states had a vested interest in 
maintaining the refugee status of Palestinians, as it prevented "Israel 
from evading responsibility for their plight" (1996:39). This formal 
resistance to local integration was evident in policies that reinforced 
refugee status. Following Arab League resolutions, specific policies 
were put in place to prevent the naturalization of Palestinian refugees. 
For example, marrying a female citizen of a host country would not 
bestow residency rights to either the husband or their children. And, 
children born in host states could not claim host nationality, although 
they are afforded refugee status under UNRWA mandate (Shiblak 
1996, UNRWA website 2006). Local integration thus thwarted, the 
refugee identity is passed on from generation to generation in host 
countries. 
Third-party resettlement, likewise, has been an unsuccessful 
solution to the protracted Palestinian refugee situation. With exclusion 
from the 1951 Refugee Convention, few Palestinians have been able to 
obtain full refugee status in North America or in Europe (Shiblak 
1996). Again, the Arab states have drafted provisions to prevent third-
country resettlement just as they have blocked efforts at local 
integration. By keeping Palestinians not just as refugees, but as an 
exceptional, collective case of refugees, the Arab states can keep 
international attention on their primary goals of repatriation to Palestine 
and compensation to Palestinians by Israel (Akram 2002). As a 
representative agency of Palestinians, the PLO has actively argued 
against treating Palestinian refugees as individual cases who could 
qualify for resettlement and has made "explicit requests that 
Palestinians not apply for refugee status in the West" (Akram 2002:43). 
This Palestinian and Arab strategy for repatriation hinges largely on the 
belief that the international community in general, and the UN in 
particular, bears responsibility for the refugee problem by enacting the 
Palestinian partition plan in 1947 and legitimizing Zionist claims to the 
land (Akram 2002). 
The final durable solution in protracted refugee situations -
repatriation - has been the central goal for Palestinians and the most 
difficult to achieve. Palestine, as the political entity many refugees left 
in 1948, no longer exists. Palestinians remaining in the occupied 
territories after 1967 are registered with the Israeli census as foreign 
residents - regardless of whether they are living in their ancestral 
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homeland or as refugees in settlements (Shiblak 1996). Despite recent 
moves toward autonomy including more formalized political 
organization and the withdrawal of Israeli settlers from Gaza and the 
West Bank, Palestine remains fragmented and the on-going conflict 
between Israelis and Palestinians is blocking refugee efforts to return. 
Refugee Status and Palestinian Identity 
Refugee status, with its entitlements and limitations, is a 
designation that Palestinians both embrace and deny. It is apparent that 
the process of becoming a refugee and the reality of remaining in exile 
for decades has a strong influence on how Palestinians are viewed by 
outsiders and how Palestinians view themselves. This notion of 
identity is complex. An understanding of Palestinian identity, therefore, 
requires a wide lens. We must examine identity both across the 
Palestinian population and how it has changed through time. 
Based on Identity Theory, Elbedour, Bastien, and Center 
assert that "identity is a cognitive scheme closely related to specific 
definitions in which we find ourselves" (1997:219). They also 
acknowledge the importance of human agency in the development of 
identity - where "people recognize that their power to influence their 
material and social environments is critical to their ideas of who they 
are" (Elbedour et al. 1997:219). While complex variables in our past 
and present circumstances help us define our own identity, the process 
of forming this identity is constantly in flux and is influenced and 
reinforced not only by how we view ourselves, but how others view us. 
In the case of Palestinian refugees, identity is not only influenced by 
displacement, it is reinforced by how Palestinians view themselves and 
how the outside world views Palestinians. 
In his study of identity among young Palestinians in the West 
Bank, Mi'ari cites concepts of identity outlined by Daniel Miller 
several decades earlier: 
Viewing identity as a social object frequently reevaluated by 
the person and others, Miller distinguished between 
objective public identity (the person as viewed by others), 
subjective public identity (the person's perception how 
others view him) and self-identity (the person as viewed by 
the self) [1998:48]. 
Public identity, both subjective and objective, is a concept that is more 
readily open for investigation. A quick glance at popular media sources 
can demonstrate how particular groups of people are identified and, 
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more often, stereotyped by others. But self-identity is "ultimately an 
internal construct" and the problem with trying to understand the self-
identity of others is that we are always on the outside looking in 
(Elbedour et al. 1997:221). 
Even the attempt at understanding how individuals and groups 
view themselves, however, can begin to narrow the divide between 'us' 
and 'them' - whether that is Israelis and Palestinians, Westerners and 
people of the Middle East, or any such populations of people. A 
number of researchers have begun to examine Palestinian identity after 
the diaspora. Mi'ari's (1998) look at Palestinian youth in the West 
Bank yielded several key components of self-identity and placed these 
sub-identities in a hierarchical order. He found that this group of 
people identified themselves first and foremost as Palestinian (national 
identity), followed by local identity (place of residence), Arab identity, 
religious identity, and lastly clan identity (Mi'ari 1998). While this 
study looked at a particular group within the Palestinian population, the 
results are concordant with other studies and can be used as a basis for 
discussion of Palestinian identity in general and the influence of 
refugee status on this identity. 
That national identity is the primary component of self-
identity for stateless persons should not be a surprising find. As 
discussed earlier in this paper, refugees are stripped of many of the 
markers of identity as a result of displacement and dispossession. 
Education and employment credentials are often unacknowledged in 
host states, rights to property are violated, and integration into new 
communities is blocked. Therefore, titles like farmer, teacher, and 
homeowner all become void in the refugee circumstance. As 
Palestinians are denied citizenship in Lebanon, Syria, and other Arab 
states, they cling to a national identity that now lacks a material basis 
(AI-Shuaibi 1979). In spite of commonalities in language, history, 
culture, and religion, Palestinians felt betrayed by other Arab 
governments and turned their focus toward national solidarity rather 
than pan-Arab unity (Peteet 1995). Before the Palestinian National 
Movement and the 1967 war, Palestinians were seen as a dispersed 
group of refugees, not a unified society. It was not until the mid-1970s 
that the term Palestinians became widely used and more recently the 
term Palestine has come to represent the once occupied territories of 
the West Bank and Gaza (Sharoni & Abu-Nimer 2004). 
This resistance to exile and resistance to the legal designation 
of refugees are strong motivators for nationalism in displaced groups. 
In an examination of other long-term refugees in Africa, Nordstrom 
notes that people resist in "complex and creative ways" and crafting 
concepts of self-identity based on resistance to aggression can be a 
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powerful conflict-resolution strategy (1998:103). At the same time, 
embracing refugee status gives many Palestinians access to UNRWA 
resources, however minimal, and legitimizes their right to return to 
Palestine. 
Within refugee groups, solidarity in national identity 
strengthens in response to a real or imagined threat from an enemy 
group. While Palestinian identity is fragmented along lines of 
geography, experience, and legal status (Peteet 1996), a collective 
identity and a sense of unity is formed in response to a common enemy 
- Israel. In their research on identity formation as studied through 
Palestinian and Israeli children's drawings, Elbedour, Bastien, and 
Center (1997) found that in conflict situations self-identity is 
influenced not only by membership within a particular group (in this 
case Palestinians), but also with reference to the 'other' group 
(Israelis). And the inter-group identity (manifested through 
nationalism) increases with the level of conflict: "the greater the 
external (social) conflict the greater the tendency to align one's identity 
with the group, and the greater the external placidity the greater the 
tendency toward concern with individual identity" (Elbedour et al. 
1997:226). In other words, those of us who live in relative peace have 
the luxury of forming an identity around individualistic aspects of our 
lives (e.g. fanner, teacher, and homeowner). Where conflict occurs to 
the level that it has in the Middle East, identity is overwhelmed by 
notions of 'us' and 'them.' 
This nationalistic collective and individual identity of 
Palestinians may prove to be the strongest barrier to peace. The 
conflict is viewed in zero-sum terms, where each side " ... holds the 
view that only one can be a nation: Either we are a nation or they are. 
They can acquire national identity and rights only at the expense of our 
identity and rights" (Elbedour et al. 1997:218, quoting Herbert 
Kelman). This either/or national identity is reinforced internally in 
many ways. A group identity has been passed from generation to 
generation. Palestinians see themselves as victims of aggression and 
pass this identity on to their children through stories of past horrors and 
abuse (Elbedour et al. 1997). The past and present circumstances of 
refugees (poverty, disaster, etc.) are explained to their children as a 
consequence of the loss of their homes and land to Israeli-Jews (Peteet 
1995). 
An 'us' and 'them' mentality is coupled with a strong sense of 
nostalgia for a Palestine that never was. Peteet (1995) proposes that 
"refugeeness" is a process of becoming rather than a one time event, 
and exile imbues refugees with nostalgia as a coping mechanism to deal 
with unstable and uncertain circumstances. This was evident in my 
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own experience working with Liberian refugees in Ghana. When 
talking about Liberia, refugees who had been living in the camp for 
almost 16 years described their homeland in terms that almost 
completely negated the bloody civil wars that wracked the country for 
decades. 
In Palestinian settlements, national identity is reinforced by 
recognizing the efforts of those individuals who resist the enemy. 
Where education and opportunities are limited among displaced groups, 
status is achieved by contributing to the struggle against Israel. Status 
in the West Bank and Gaza is attained by participating in 
demonstrations, throwing stones, and facing arrest, deportation, and 
death (Elbedour et al. 1997). This status is even conferred to families 
of those involved in the struggle. The Palestinian national movement 
endows the mothers of martyrs with national icon status and maternal 
sacrifice has become normalized in Palestinian society (Peteet 1997). 
That Palestine itself is often referred to as a "mother" or the 
"motherland" in poetry, prose, and song creates an interesting parallel 
when considering notions of sacrifice. 
The sense of place is also an important factor in creating the 
. Palestinian identity and is directly tied to the refugee experience. In the 
West Bank, the hand-painted street signs displaying names of martyrs 
of the intifada (Arabic for uprising) can be viewed as an attempt of 
refugees to claim space with symbols of resistance (Peteet 1995). A 
common feature on the walls of Palestinian homes in the West Bank, 
Gaza, or surrounding Arab states is a bronze map of Palestine - a 
region that includes the contested territories as well as pre-partition 
Palestine. Produced in PLO-financed workshops, these maps strengthen 
ideas of nationalism and belonging to people scattered from their 
ancestral homelands. Similarly, young Palestinians all over the Middle 
East wear small gold maps of Palestine on chains around their necks 
(Peteet 1995). Mi'ari (1998) found that many refugees who left their 
villages or towns in the original diaspora still identify themselves with 
those places that they left fifty years earlier. 
Ideas about family and familial identity are affected by the 
refugee experience. That clan identity ranks last on Mi'ari's list for 
Palestinian youth in the West Bank is also not surprising. In leaving 
villages and towns, refugees fractured the kinship and lineage systems 
that had tied groups of people together for generations. In a rare 
examination of Palestinians prior to the diaspora, Peretz (1977) writes 
that many of the earliest refugees were Palestinian-Arabs from the 
upper and middle classes. These families sought refuge with family or 
friends in neighboring areas, until conflict pushed people further and 
further away from their kin groups. Palestinian refugees now found 
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themselves united more by the common experience of exile, rather than 
a reliance on family bonds. In refugee camps in Lebanon, it was "not 
uncommon for widows to prefer to live in proximity to others from [the 
camp] rather than their own kin because of their common experience 
and their awareness that in a situation of prolonged civil war their 
presence was burdensome to family members" (Peteet 1995:183). 
This disruption of kinship groups is evident by a clear 
distinction between Palestinian refugees and non-refugees. A 1992 
survey examining refugee and non-refugee conditions (housing, 
amenities, occupation, home ownership, and wealth) found an 
important difference. UNRWA registered refugees have a significantly 
higher educational level than non-refugees, but are generally less well-
off (Sayigh 1998). The study suggested that intact kinship groups 
among non-refugees afforded these Palestinians more links between 
groups and property, and this factor was more critical to household 
income and status than educational background (Sayigh 1998). 
Clearly, the refugee experience would influence concepts of identity, 
shifting from a common family group to a common displaced group. 
And, in the case of Palestinian refugees, not identifying with kin groups 
has serious economic impacts. 
This brings me to my last point on Palestinian identity and 
refugee status. As demonstrated by the distinction between refugee and 
non-refugee Palestinians, any discussion of Palestinian identity (and 
refugee status, for that matter) should not generalize too much. 
Palestinians are not one homogenous group of people with a single 
identity. Self-identity by its very nature is individualistic and, while 
there are commonalities like a strong sense of nationalism, we should 
not assume that there is one typical Palestinian identity that represents 
the group as a whole. Likewise, the experience of each refugee is 
unique and has different effects on how each individual formulates 
their own identity. 
Palestinians of different genders, with different religious 
beliefs, socio-economic backgrounds, and from markedly different 
areas of traditional Palestine became refugees and have remained in 
exile for decades. This common experience serves to unite them under 
a national identity, but should not negate the diversity within the 
refugee populations. In terms of gender, the refugee experience can 
differ significantly for men and women. In her examination of gender-
based discrimination of UN RW A policies, Cervenak (1994) found that 
the UNRWA has adopted a patrilineal system of conferring refugee 
status from generation to generation through the father. Palestinian 
refugee women who marry non-refugees maintain their status and 
access to UNRWA resources, but their children are ineligible for 
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assistance. In contrast, the children of refugee men who marry non-
refugee women can register with UNRWA and receive assistance 
(Cervenak 1994). While the UNRWA benefits have been called 
minimal by many, access to food and health services can literally mean 
the difference between life and death for impoverished children. 
Peteet also makes a distinction between refugee men and 
women in terms of mobility and how that has changed with time: 
Because cultural constraints circumscribe female mobility, 
women in refugee camps moved in more spatially bounded 
areas. For women, the world exterior to the camps was an 
alien and dangerous one ... During the era of Palestinian 
military power in Lebanon, however, women moved with 
safety in Lebanese areas but usually with less frequency than 
men. Paradoxically, as danger approached and Palestinians 
as a community were endangered, women's mobility was 
enhanced. While trust in the world exterior to the camps was 
completely suspended, Palestinians placed some trust in 
Arab cultural practices that ensured the safety of women 
during times of conflict [1995:176]. 
Thus the process of becoming a refugee and living in exile is 
experienced differently by men and women, and would impact identity 
accordingly. 
Religion also played a role in a differential experience 
between many Palestinian refugees. Before dispersion, roughly 88 
percent of Palestinian peoples were Muslim and the remaining were 
Christian (Khalidi 1991). In some host states, refugees were treated 
differently based on religion. In states that enforced clear policies for 
Palestinian refugees, like Lebanon, some exceptions were made. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, nearly fifty thousand refugees were 
granted Lebanese nationality. These refugees were overwhelmingly 
Christians or those that had family connections (Shiblak 1996). 
Knudsen (2005) suggests that the Lebanese government was 
particularly sensitive to the numerical balance between Christians and 
Muslims within their state. Naturalizing all Palestinian refugees (the 
majority of them Sunni Muslims) would upset this "precarious 
demographic balance" (Knudsen 2005:222). Instead, this decision 
created a further division between Christian and Muslim refugees. 
Gender and religion are just two examples of the many factors 
that influence identity. And, like the many other components of 
identity, these factors should be explored further in order to more fully 
understand the diversity of identities within the Palestinian population. 
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However, for this discussion, it is more important to recognize that 
identity is created and influenced by a number of factors within and 
between populations and the influence of various factors is differential 
depending upon time and circumstance. While components like gender 
and religion provide variation in Palestinian identity, it is my assertion 
that refugee status is a powerful influence on Palestinian identity, in 
general, and contributes to a collective sense of victimization and 
nationalism among Palestinian people. 
Conclusions 
It is remarkable that Palestinians, Middle East states, and the 
international community are still looking for solutions to a refugee 
situation that was created more than fifty years ago. It is also evident 
that, with time, problems associated with this situation and with the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict overall are becoming firmly entrenched in 
the Middle East and increasingly resistant to change. Many refugees 
are actively resisting assimilation in host countries and holding out for 
repatriation. Other refugees and non-refugees within the contested 
territories are using political and military power to challenge Israel's 
actions in the West Bank and Gaza. While a number of international 
and regional proclamations have affirmed the right of Palestinian 
refugees to return, an apt question at this point is "a return to what?" 
Peteet acknowledges that while a state is conceivable in the 
West Bank and Gaza, "it cannot accommodate all diaspora 
Palestinians" (1995:171). The magnitude and diversity of Palestinian 
refugees mean that any durable solution to their plight must make 
allowances for the complexity of the situation. The experiences of 
Palestinians and the formation of self-identities are influenced by a 
multitude of factors: refugee and non-refugee status, men and women, 
place of origin, place of exile, religious beliefs, etc. The internationally-
recognized political organizations of Palestine cannot encompass all 
Palestinians, as "dispersion deprives them of a single voice" (Sayigh 
1998:22). Even the notion of a collective Palestinian identity steeped 
in nationalism and resistant to change creates an internal and external 
barrier to solving the refugee problem. 
While the focus of this paper has been on refugee status and 
Palestinian identity, any proposed resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict must also acknowledge the existence of an Israeli identity and 
how both identities can influence the peace process. Just as Palestinian 
identity is formed around two reference groups - their own and the 
perceived enemy group, Israeli identity would be equally influenced. 
Elbedour, Bastien, and Center argue that "it is a very safe assumption 
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that children in Israel are undergoing the same identity problems as are 
the children of the West Bank and Gaza" (1997:228). 
While protracted refugee situations are found around the 
world and encompass millions of displaced people, the scale and 
longevity of the Palestinian refugee situation is unparalleled. There are 
significant difficulties in resolving any protracted situation and in 
shielding refugees from human rights abuses - even with the 
intervention of the UNHCR and the rights and protections granted these 
refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention. Palestinians are 
categorically excluded from these rights and protections and the 
UNRWA services provided to refugees have not moved them closer to 
resettlement, local integration, or repatriation. The fact that refugees 
have languished in exile for more than fifty years suggests that local, 
regional, and international bodies all have a moral responsibility to re-
examine the situation and provide new avenues for change. 
Finally, in researching refugee status and its relationship to 
Palestinian identity, it was not my intent to perpetuate ideas of a single, 
homogenous group - rather, to identify commonalities and significant 
factors that would contribute to the formation of identity (or more 
appropriately multiple identities) within this population. The images 
that are portrayed in Western media tend to depict the typified 
Palestinian - nationalistic, radical, and militant - without understanding 
the basis for this collective identity or acknowledging the diversity of 
peoples that call themselves Palestinian. Only by understanding the 
conditions that create stateless persons and the incredible circumstances 
in which they live can we move one step closer to resolving the 
problem for at! refugees in the Middle East and around the world. 
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